Cloud detection and response (CDR): A pillar guide for security architects

Key insights

  • CDR is a runtime discipline, not a product: It detects, investigates, and responds to active threats across the cloud control, data, and management planes — the surfaces EDR and SIEM cannot fully see.
  • The three-plane model is the architectural anchor: Control-plane events (CloudTrail, Activity Logs, Audit Logs), data-plane runtime telemetry, and management-plane identity events together produce the high-fidelity signals that CDR analyzes.
  • Identity is the dominant attack surface: Roughly 83% of cloud breaches in 2026 involve identity compromise, and cloud-attack breakout time is now measured in minutes — machine-speed detection is no longer optional.
  • CDR complements, not replaces, your stack: It feeds extended detection and response and SIEM; pairs with CSPM (posture) and CWPP (workload hardening); and is increasingly delivered as the runtime leg of CNAPP.
  • Compliance is now an operational requirement: NIS2 demands a 24-hour early warning and 72-hour notification, and UK GDPR requires 72-hour ICO notification. CDR's real-time detection is what lets regulated entities meet those clocks.

Cloud detection and response (CDR) is the runtime discipline that finds and stops active threats inside cloud environments — the layer between posture management and incident response where most modern breaches actually unfold. It is also a category that analysts and vendors are still arguing about. A May 2024 Forrester analysis called CDR a feature, not a market. Two years later, Forrester's Q1 2026 Wave for Cloud-Native Application Protection Solutions evaluated 14 vendors with material CDR coverage. Whatever you call it, the capability is now central to how regulated enterprises detect identity abuse, control-plane attacks, and ephemeral-workload compromise — the breaches that traditional endpoint detection and response and SIEM tooling were never designed to see.

This guide explains what CDR is, how it works, how it differs from EDR, NDR, XDR, CSPM, CWPP, CNAPP, and SIEM, and how it maps to NIS2, NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3, and UK GDPR. We use real cloud breaches — Capital One, Snowflake, UNC6426, the European Commission — to show what CDR signals look like in practice, not in marketing.

What is cloud detection and response?

Cloud detection and response (CDR) is a continuous-monitoring discipline that detects, investigates, and responds to active threats across the cloud control, data, and management planes. It ingests cloud-native telemetry — CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs, runtime process events — and applies behavioral analytics to surface attacks that traditional EDR, SIEM, and posture tools miss.

Cloud needs a new approach because the assumptions that built endpoint security no longer hold. Per Sysdig's 2025 Cloud-Native Security and Usage Report, 60% of containers live less than a minute — there is often no persistent host to put an agent on, and forensic evidence vanishes faster than batch-mode log aggregators can preserve it. Identity has displaced the network as the dominant initial-access vector: roughly 83% of cloud breaches in 2026 begin with identity compromise, and industry threat intelligence research reported a 266% year-over-year surge in cloud-conscious intrusions for 2026. The financial picture matches the operational one: Ponemon Institute's Cost of a Data Breach lineage has consistently shown multi-cloud breaches running roughly $1M higher than on-premises incidents — an average near $5.05M in the most recent editions.

Cloud security monitoring — the broader practice of watching cloud activity for risk and policy violations — overlaps with CDR but is not the same thing. Monitoring describes the telemetry-collection function; CDR is the active-detection-and-response discipline built on top of that telemetry. Adjacent terms you will see in vendor and analyst material include cloud-native detection and response (CNDR) and cloud threat detection and response (CTDR). They mean substantively the same thing.

The category itself is contested. Forrester's May 2024 position was that "cloud detection and response tools do not exist" as a discrete market. Two years later, Forrester's Q1 2026 Wave for Cloud-Native Application Protection Solutions evaluates 14 vendors with material CDR capability — a meaningful drift in framing. Vendor pillar pages from Wiz, Sysdig, and Tenable describe CDR as an emerging discipline within the cloud security family. We treat the underlying capability — runtime threat detection across the three cloud planes — as real and necessary, regardless of how the buying line is drawn.

Where the term "CDR" comes from

CDR emerged as a vendor-coined category between roughly 2022 and 2024, as cloud-native breaches outpaced what posture tools (CSPM) and workload-hardening tools (CWPP) could address on their own. Gartner positions CDR within the cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) family — a positioning broadly consistent with how most enterprise buyers now structure cloud-security stacks.

How cloud detection and response works

The clearest analogy comes from Sysdig: think of CDR as an always-on security camera for the cloud. Endpoint tools tell you what happened on a single machine. Posture tools tell you what your configuration looked like at a point in time. CDR tells you what is happening right now across every plane, every provider, and every workload — and stitches those signals into a single attack story. Operationally, the discipline runs through six steps:

  1. Ingest cloud-native telemetry from every plane and provider (AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, SaaS).
  2. Normalize logs across providers — CloudTrail, Activity Logs, and Audit Logs use different schemas.
  3. Analyze with behavioral analytics — baseline identity and resource behavior, then flag anomalies.
  4. Enrich detections with identity context, threat intelligence, and asset metadata.
  5. Stitch related signals into a single attack storyline aligned to the cyber kill chain.
  6. Respond — automate containment for low-risk actions; require human-in-the-loop approval for high-risk ones (revoke session, isolate workload, freeze IAM principal).

The third and fourth steps are where CDR earns its keep. Signature-only detection cannot keep up with cloud attacker velocity, and raw alert volume from CloudTrail alone is unmanageable. Behavioral baselines — what does this principal normally do? what does this workload normally talk to? — turn that volume into stitched, high-fidelity incident response signals.

Agent versus agentless: deployment models

The agent-versus-agentless debate is real but increasingly false-binary. Agentless CDR — snapshot-based and API-driven — gives breadth and fast deployment with zero workload friction. It is excellent for control-plane and management-plane visibility, multi-account coverage, and onboarding tempo. Agent-based CDR (typically eBPF or sidecar) gives runtime depth: process-level events, syscall traces, network calls inside containers, and the kind of data-plane forensics that ephemeral workloads otherwise erase. Most modern programs combine both — agentless for breadth, agent-based for depth on critical workloads and Kubernetes security clusters where runtime forensics matters.

The role of AI and behavioral analytics

Behavior-based detection is now mainstream, not aspirational. Per Sysdig's 2026 reporting, more than 70% of teams use behavior-based detection covering 91% of environments. Auto-termination of suspicious processes rose roughly 140% year-over-year. Only about 2.8% of managed cloud identities are human — the rest are service principals, machine identities, and ephemeral workload tokens, which is exactly why identity-context enrichment is non-negotiable. AI-specific package adoption grew about 25x year-over-year, expanding the supply-chain attack surface that CDR has to watch.

The defender response is "machine-speed parity." Dark Reading has popularized the 5/5/5 benchmark — 5 seconds to detect, 5 minutes to triage, 5 minutes to respond — as the operational target for cloud-conscious adversary scenarios where breakout time is measured in minutes, not hours.

The three-plane architecture: control, data, and management

Most CDR confusion clears up the moment you separate the cloud surface into its three planes. This is the architectural anchor every security architect should be able to draw on a whiteboard in 30 seconds.

  • Control plane — the API and management surface where configuration, orchestration, and IAM events occur. Telemetry: AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs. Detections: anomalous IAM-role assumption, OIDC trust-policy abuse, unexpected CloudFormation stack creation with CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM outside change windows, anomalous S3 policy changes.
  • Data plane — the runtime layer where workloads (containers, VMs, serverless functions) actually execute. Telemetry: process events, syscalls, container runtime, network flows, eBPF-derived signals. Detections: process-spawn anomalies, container escape attempts, unexpected outbound calls, cryptominer execution.
  • Management plane — identity, billing, governance, and federation surface (admin actions, federated-identity events, service-principal behavior, billing anomalies). Detections: privilege-escalation chains, anomalous service-principal behavior, federated-token abuse, unusual cross-account assume-role activity.

A useful mental picture: the control plane is the cloud's switchboard, the data plane is the workshop where work actually happens, and the management plane is the front office where identity and governance decisions are made. Attackers need to traverse at least two planes to do meaningful damage. Defenders need visibility into all three to catch them.

Mapping telemetry sources to planes

The table below maps each plane to its typical telemetry sources, an example detection, and the MITRE ATT&CK technique it surfaces. This mapping is the difference between alert noise and a usable detection backlog.

Table 1: Mapping cloud telemetry sources to the three CDR detection planes.

Plane Typical telemetry Example detection MITRE ATT&CK technique
Control CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs Anomalous IAM-role assumption from non-CI principal T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
Control CloudFormation, ARM, Deployment Manager events CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM stack creation outside change window T1098 Account Manipulation
Data Container runtime, eBPF, process events, network flows Container escape attempt or unexpected outbound call T1611 Escape to Host
Data VM and serverless runtime telemetry Cryptominer execution on production workload T1496 Resource Hijacking
Management IAM events, federated-identity logs, admin-action logs Federated-token abuse via OIDC trust misconfiguration T1552 Unsecured Credentials
Management Cross-account assume-role telemetry Lateral movement across accounts T1021 Remote Services

The 2026 numbers explain why this map matters now. Cloud-attack breakout time has compressed to roughly 29 minutes per Google Cloud's Threat Horizons H1 2026 report. The UNC6426 cluster, which we will return to in the case studies, achieved full AWS administrative access in under 72 hours from a single compromised npm package — the entire attack chain crossed all three planes (control-plane stack creation, management-plane OIDC trust abuse, data-plane S3 enumeration). For more on the control-plane attack surface specifically, see cloud control plane protection.

CDR versus EDR, NDR, XDR, CSPM, CWPP, CNAPP, and SIEM

The most common architectural question in CDR evaluations is "what does this replace?" The honest answer: nothing. CDR's distinctive scope is runtime threat detection across the three cloud planes — a surface that endpoint, network, posture, and workload tools each see only partially. The categories are complementary, and most modern programs deploy several together.

  • CDR vs EDR — Endpoint detection and response sees managed endpoints and servers. CDR sees the cloud control plane and ephemeral workloads where no persistent endpoint agent can live. EDR is essential for laptop and server fleets; CDR is essential for AWS, Azure, GCP, and Kubernetes runtime.
  • CDR vs NDRNetwork detection and response sees east-west and north-south network traffic. CDR sees cloud-native API and identity events. They are complementary in hybrid cloud security environments where on-prem network and cloud control plane both matter.
  • CDR vs XDR — XDR is a correlation layer across many sources. CDR is a domain-specific detection layer that produces high-fidelity signals XDR can ingest. See EDR vs XDR for how the broader correlation model evolved from endpoint origins.
  • CDR vs CSPM — Cloud security posture management finds misconfigurations at rest. CDR finds active exploitation in motion. CSPM tells you the door was unlocked; CDR tells you someone walked through it. Complementary, not competitive.
  • CDR vs CWPP — Cloud workload protection platforms harden individual workloads (vulnerability scanning, configuration enforcement, runtime protection). CDR detects active threats across the broader cloud surface, including the control and management planes that CWPP does not see. Often delivered together inside CNAPP.
  • CDR vs CNAPP — CNAPP is the platform family that bundles CSPM, CWPP, CDR, and others. CDR is the runtime-detection-and-response leg of CNAPP — not a competing category.
  • CDR vs SIEM — SIEM aggregates and correlates logs across the entire enterprise. CDR is purpose-built for cloud telemetry semantics — IAM relationships, ephemeral identifiers, multi-account graphs. Most modern programs feed CDR signals into SIEM optimization workflows rather than choosing between the two. TechTarget's neutral analysis of CDR versus EDR, NDR, and XDR reaches the same conclusion.

Table 2: How CDR's scope compares to adjacent detection-and-response categories.

Capability CDR EDR NDR CSPM/CWPP SIEM/XDR
Cloud control plane detection (CloudTrail, IAM, OIDC) Primary No Partial Partial (CSPM at rest) Through ingestion
Cloud data-plane runtime detection (containers, serverless) Primary No Partial (network) Partial (CWPP) Through ingestion
Cloud management plane / identity-event detection Primary No No Partial Through ingestion
Endpoint runtime detection (laptops, managed servers) No Primary No No Through ingestion
Network-traffic detection (east-west, north-south) No No Primary No Through ingestion
Posture / misconfiguration at rest No No No Primary (CSPM) Reporting only
Cross-domain correlation across all of the above Feeds in Feeds in Feeds in Feeds in Primary (XDR/SIEM)

Is CDR a real category or just a feature set?

This deserves a direct answer. Forrester's May 2024 position was that CDR is not a discrete market — that the capability lives inside CNAPP, SIEM, and adjacent platforms and does not warrant a separate buying line. The argument was reasonable in 2024 and has weakened since. Forrester's Q1 2026 Wave for Cloud-Native Application Protection Solutions evaluated 14 vendors with material CDR coverage, which complicates a strict "feature, not category" reading. Hyperscaler consolidation reinforces the drift: Google completed its $32B acquisition of Wiz on March 11, 2026, per TechCrunch's coverage of the close, bringing material CDR capability inside a hyperscaler portfolio.

Our reading: the underlying capability is real, necessary, and not adequately covered by EDR, NDR, CSPM, CWPP, or SIEM alone. Whether you buy it as a discrete product or as a leg of CNAPP depends on stack composition. Greenfield programs typically consolidate into CNAPP. Mature programs with strong existing SIEM and EDR investments often run CDR as a discrete layer that feeds the rest of the stack.

Cloud detection and response in practice

Abstract category arguments are easier to settle with concrete attacks. The four breaches below show what CDR signals look like across the three planes, and what their absence cost the affected organizations.

Case 1 — Capital One (July 2019, retrospective). Misconfigured AWS WAF combined with server-side request forgery (SSRF) let an attacker abuse an EC2 instance metadata IAM role to enumerate and exfiltrate roughly 106M U.S. and Canadian credit-card applicant records from S3. The attack timeline ran for months before discovery. CDR signal: anomalous data-plane and control-plane behavior — a single IAM principal pulling unusual S3 read volumes, originating from an EC2 instance whose normal behavior never included bulk S3 enumeration. This is exactly the cross-plane signal that behavioral analytics on CloudTrail, paired with AWS threat detection, is designed to surface.

Case 2 — Snowflake (2024). Credential reuse (some traceable to infostealer logs from 2020) plus missing customer-side MFA enforcement led to roughly 165 customer organizations being affected. The Cloud Security Alliance's 2024 Snowflake retrospective is the authoritative public analysis. CDR signal: anomalous-geo logins, elevated query volumes, and the absence of MFA on high-privilege SaaS auth surfaces — all detectable via management-plane identity telemetry. The lesson is that credential theft outcomes are a SaaS-tier CDR concern, not just an endpoint one.

Case 3 — UNC6426 (Q1 2026). This is the cleanest three-plane case study in the public record. A compromised npm package (QUIETVAULT) — a textbook supply chain attack — stole GitHub tokens. An overly broad GitHub-to-AWS OIDC trust policy let those tokens assume an AWS IAM role. CloudFormation was used to create an IAM stack with CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM, which granted the attacker AWS administrative access in under 72 hours. The attacker then enumerated S3, terminated EC2 and RDS instances, and decrypted application keys. The chain is documented in The Hacker News' coverage of the UNC6426 npm supply-chain attack, the Cloud Security Alliance's OIDC trust-chain abuse briefing, and Google Cloud's Threat Horizons H1 2026 report. CDR signal: STS token issuance from a non-CI principal combined with CloudFormation CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM stack creation outside the change window — a stitched control-plane and management-plane storyline that no single tool category catches alone.

Case 4 — European Commission Europa.eu (March 2026). A Trivy supply-chain compromise produced a five-day adversary dwell window during which roughly 91.7 GB was exfiltrated from EU-hosted AWS infrastructure. CERT-EU's blog on the European Commission cloud breach, BleepingComputer's coverage, and Help Net Security's reporting document the timeline. CDR signal: control-plane API anomalies sustained over a five-day window — the kind of pattern that posture-only tools cannot see and that batch-mode SIEM correlation typically misses without cloud-native context.

Table 3: Incident timeline and CDR signals across recent cloud breaches.

Incident Year Initial vector CDR signal Plane(s)
Capital One 2019 WAF misconfiguration + SSRF Anomalous IAM-role data access from single principal pulling unusual S3 volumes Control + Data
Snowflake 2024 Credential reuse + missing customer MFA Anomalous-geo logins, elevated query volumes, MFA absence on SaaS auth Management
UNC6426 Q1 2026 npm-package compromise → OIDC trust abuse STS token issuance from non-CI principal + CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM stack outside change window Control + Management
European Commission March 2026 Trivy supply-chain compromise Sustained control-plane API anomalies over 5-day dwell window Control + Data

Forensics on ephemeral workloads

Ephemeral workloads break the assumptions of traditional digital forensics. When 60% of containers live less than a minute, post-hoc evidence collection is often impossible. The operational answer is real-time capture and immutable preservation:

  1. Capture process events and network telemetry in real time with eBPF-based agents on critical workloads — the only reliable way to preserve syscall-level evidence before a container terminates.
  2. Extend cloud-provider audit-log retention beyond the typical 30-90-day default, especially for control-plane and IAM events. Long-dwell-time intrusions like the EU Commission breach can outrun default retention.
  3. Preserve cloud-snapshot evidence at the time of detection — EBS snapshots, Azure managed-disk snapshots, GCP persistent-disk snapshots — and tag them as forensic artifacts to prevent automatic cleanup.
  4. Maintain forensic chain of custody using cloud-provider-immutable storage primitives (S3 Object Lock with compliance mode, Azure Immutable Blob storage). Write-once retention is the foundation of admissible cloud forensics.

Detecting and preventing cloud threats

The seven defensive practices below are aggregated from cross-vendor pillar guidance and tied to specific MITRE ATT&CK techniques where applicable. Frame them as defensive controls, not vendor checklists.

  1. Cover all environments — public, private, multi-cloud, SaaS. Single-provider monitoring is the most common silo and the most common detection gap.
  2. Continuous real-time monitoring — ingest CloudTrail, Activity Logs, and Audit Logs at runtime. Batch-mode log aggregation will not meet the 5/5/5 benchmark or NIS2 24-hour timelines.
  3. Behavioral analytics over signature-only — correlate cross-resource events into single storylines. The 70% of teams now using behavior-based detection covering 91% of environments are doing this because rule-based detection cannot keep up with cloud attacker velocity.
  4. Identity context is mandatory — correlate runtime events with identity actions (T1078.004, T1552). The 83% identity-origin breach figure is the whole reason identity threat detection and response and identity-based attack detection and containment are now adjacent to CDR.
  5. Automated response with human-in-the-loop guardrails — revoke sessions automatically; require human approval for IAM-role suspensions on production accounts. Automation without guardrails creates outages.
  6. Integrate with SIEM and SOAR — CDR enriches existing platforms rather than replacing them. Forward high-fidelity stitched detections to SOC operations, not raw alert volume.
  7. Plan for ephemerality — capture forensic evidence in real time, not post-hoc. Assume the workload will be gone before you finish triaging.

Table 4: Seven defensive practices that make cloud detection and response operationally effective.

Practice What it prevents MITRE ATT&CK technique
Multi-environment coverage Detection blind spots across providers Cloud matrix (TA0001TA0010)
Continuous real-time monitoring Late detection beyond NIS2 24-hour clock Various
Behavioral analytics Novel attacks signature tools miss T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
Identity-context enrichment Identity-origin breaches (83% of cloud incidents) T1552 Unsecured Credentials
Automated response with human-in-the-loop Operational outages from over-eager automation T1098 Account Manipulation
SIEM and SOAR integration Alert duplication and operational noise Cross-cutting
Ephemeral-workload forensic preservation Lost evidence on sub-minute container lifecycles T1611 Escape to Host

For a deeper treatment of the underlying detection discipline, see threat detection and the MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix. For a complementary use-case framing, TechTarget's CDR use-cases analysis is a useful neutral reference. Industry frameworks worth aligning against include the OWASP Cloud-Native Application Security Top 10 and the ENISA Cloud Security Guide.

Cloud detection and response and compliance

CDR is now a compliance capability as much as a security one. The 24-hour and 72-hour clocks in current EU and UK regulation are not satisfiable with batch-mode log review and manual triage.

  • NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3 (April 2025) — the first update to the U.S. government incident-handling guide since 2012. It explicitly addresses cloud environments and log-retention limitations and maps incident response into NIST CSF 2.0 Detect, Respond, and Recover functions. The full text is available from NIST. It pairs with NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture — see zero trust for the broader architectural context — as the foundational federal guidance for cloud detection programs.
  • NIS2 (EU) — Article 23 incident reporting requires a 24-hour early warning and a 72-hour incident notification with initial assessment. Maximum fines reach €10M or 2% of global turnover for essential entities. The European Commission's NIS2 directive page is the primary source. Real-time CDR detection is what makes the 24-hour timeline operationally achievable.
  • UK GDPR — Article 33 requires 72-hour ICO breach notification. The same operational requirement: detection that identifies in-scope incidents fast enough to start the clock with confidence. See the UK ICO's NIS and UK GDPR breach guidance and GDPR compliance for the broader regulatory context.
  • UK Cyber Security and Resilience Bill — drafting at the time of writing; expected mid-to-late 2026. Adds further reporting and resilience obligations for UK essential and digital-service entities.
  • MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix — the defensive evidence-of-effectiveness anchor for audit conversations. Mapping CDR detections to ATT&CK techniques lets compliance teams demonstrate coverage in concrete terms.
  • CISA Cloud Security Reference Architecture — relevant for U.S. federal and CSP-adjacent contexts; the CISA SCuBA project page is the canonical entry point.

Table 5: How CDR capabilities map to major cloud incident-response regulations.

Framework Requirement CDR capability Evidence source
NIS2 Article 23 24-hour early warning + 72-hour notification Real-time control- and management-plane detection European Commission
UK GDPR Article 33 72-hour ICO breach notification Stitched detection + identity-context enrichment UK ICO
NIST SP 800-61r3 Detect / Respond / Recover (CSF 2.0) Continuous cloud-native telemetry + automated containment NIST
MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Defensive coverage evidence Detection-to-technique mapping MITRE

Modern approaches and where the category is going

Three forces are reshaping CDR over the next 12 to 24 months. First, AI-first cloud defense is moving from concept to product — agentic remediation that detects an anomaly and contains it without human intervention is now visible across the leading CNAPP entrants in the Q1 2026 Forrester Wave. Second, hyperscaler consolidation accelerated meaningfully with the close of Google's $32B Wiz acquisition on March 11, 2026; independent CDR vendors will need to differentiate on signal quality and integration neutrality across multi-cloud. Third, defenders are shifting toward machine-speed parity with AI-assisted attackers — Sysdig's 2026 reporting shows behavior-based detection and auto-termination as standard practice, not differentiation.

For sub-5-FTE security teams, the implication is that some form of managed detection and response is increasingly the right answer for cloud — the operational tempo required to meet 5/5/5 and 24-hour-NIS2 clocks is hard to sustain in-house at small team sizes. The category outlook is consolidation: CDR as a discrete buying line will continue for organizations with mature CNAPP stacks; it will collapse into platform CNAPP for organizations starting greenfield. Either way, the runtime-detection capability is non-optional. Industry positioning summaries — including Medium's overview of Gartner CDR positioning and vendor framework references such as Skyhawk's CDR best-practices framework — offer additional context.

How Vectra AI thinks about cloud detection and response

Vectra AI's approach to cloud detection and response reflects an "assume compromise" philosophy applied to the cloud: continuous observability across the three planes, AI-driven Attack Signal Intelligence™ to cut noise and reveal stitched attack storylines, and informed action that contains active threats before lateral movement takes hold. The aim is not more alerts — it is the right signal at machine speed. Independent IDC analysis of the Vectra AI platform found greater than 90% MITRE ATT&CK technique coverage and 391% ROI with a 6-month payback. For AWS-specific runtime coverage, see Vectra AI CDR for AWS.

Conclusion

Cloud detection and response is the runtime layer that turns cloud telemetry into stitched attack stories — not another product category competing with EDR, NDR, or SIEM, but the discipline that finally makes the three cloud planes legible to security operations. The shift from posture-only and endpoint-only thinking is no longer optional. Identity is the dominant initial-access vector. Workloads are ephemeral. Breakout time is measured in minutes. Regulators are imposing 24-hour clocks. The organizations that will hold up under those conditions are the ones treating runtime cloud detection as a first-class capability, however they choose to package it.

If you are building or refreshing a cloud-detection program, start with the three-plane mental model, map your existing telemetry against it, and identify the planes where you have detection rather than just logging. Pair CDR with behavioral analytics, feed it into your existing SIEM and extended detection and response workflows, and align the detection coverage to the MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix so audit conversations have concrete evidence to work from. To go deeper on adjacent disciplines, see identity threat detection and response, AWS threat detection, and Kubernetes security in the related topics below. For a methodology view, the Vectra AI platform page (linked above) describes how Attack Signal Intelligence™ approaches the same problem.

FAQs

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